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I. INTRODUCTION
For more than fifty years, labor law in American law schools has
been synonymous with the law of collective labor relations.' Until re-
cently,2 labor law courses and scholarship have heavily emphasized
* Professor of Law, University of Nebraska College of Law. B.A., 1974, Northland
College; M.S., J.D., 1976 University of Wisconsin. Research for this article was
made possible by a Ross McCollum Summer Research Grant.
1. This equation of labor law with collective labor relations dates, of course, from
enactment of the Wagner Act in 1935. National Labor Relations Act, Ch. 372, 49
Stat. 449 (1935)(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982)).
2. This symposium issue is the latest evidence of the increased interest in individual
employment rights. See also M. RoTSTEIN, A. KNAPP & L. LmBMAN, EMPLOY-
MENT LAW (1987); Federal Regulation of Work From Recruitment to Retirement,
49 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoBs., (Autumn 1986); St. Antoine, Federal Regulation of
the Workplace in the Next Half Century, 61 CM.-KENT L. REv. 631, 634-35, 655-61
(1985); Wirt, On Teaching Labor Law, in THE PARK Crry PAPERs 1 (1985); Sum-
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the relationship between unions and employers, while de-emphasizing
(or completely ignoring) other important aspects of the employment
relationship. With the gradual, but seemingly inexorable, decline in
the proportion of the workforce that is unionized,3 it has become in-
creasingly evident that this conception of labor law is too narrow. 4
For the vast majority of today's workers and employers, labor law is
relevant only to the extent it considers individual employment rights,
employment rights outside of the context of collective bargaining.
This article considers one type of individual employment right, a
type which I will call "minimal terms." Minimal terms are minimal
substantive terms of employment which are required by the govern-
ment and which are usually nonwaivable.5 Minimal terms are cer-
tainly not a new phenomenon. They can be found in English law as
early as 1464 in the late Middle Ages, 6 and have a long history in this
country as well.7 In recent years, however, the importance of minimal
terms in this country8 has increased as the significance of collective
bargaining has diminished.9 The government has increasingly stepped
in to require minimal terms which, it was once hoped, would be pro-
vided through the collective bargaining process.
Minimal terms present a basic challenge to the student of labor
law. Unlike collective labor relations, the subject does not have a nat-
ural organizing principle.10 Minimal terms are found in dozens, if not
mers, What We Should Teach in Labor Law: The Need for a Change and a Sug-
gested Direction, in THE PARK CITY PAPERS 193 (1985).
3. Union membership as a proportion of the nonagricultural workforce has steadily
declined from nearly 35 percent in 1954, Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing
Workers' Rights to Se-Organization Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769,
1771-72 (1983), to less than 18 percent today. [1 Analysis/News and Background
Information] 124 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 140 (1987).
4. Professor Weiler has described contemporary labor law with its emphasis on col-
lective bargaining as "an elegant tombstone for a dying institution." Weiler,
supra note 3, at 1769.
5. See infra notes 47-60 and accompanying text.
6. See, e.g., P. DAVIES & M. FREEDLAND, KAHN-FREUND'S LABOUR AND THE LAW 19
(3d ed. 1983) [hereinafter KAHN-FREuND]; S. BINDOFF, TUDOR ENGLAND 200-02
(1950)(describing the Statute of Artificers of 1563, an early statute regulating
labor).
7. See De Vyver, Regulation of Wages and Hours Prior to 1938,6 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 323 (1939); R. COVINGTON, LABOR RELATIONS AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS: SO-
CIAL LEGISLATION 8-16 (1974).
8. The United States has been a relative latecomer to the widespread use of minimal
terms. Other countries, and in particular European countries, have used them
earlier and more extensively. Estreicher, Unjust Dismissal Laws: Some Caution-
ary Notes, 33 AM. J. COmp. L. 310 (1985); KAHN-FREuND, supra note 6, at 37-64.
See generally BusmESS LAw IN EUROPE (M. Ellis & P. Storm eds. 1982).
9. This result was predicted by Otto Kahn-Freund in his classic work LABOUR AND
THE LAw. KAHN-FREuND, supra note 6, at 52.




hundreds, of separate laws;31 they pursue different and sometimes
conflicting policy objectives;12 they have separate and diverse enforce-
ment schemes.S One value of an economic analysis of minimal terms
is that it provides a mechanism for organizing this vast and unruly
subject. Economics permits a general analysis of minimal terms which
avoids the distracting maze of rules, policies and procedures which in-
terferes with other types of general analyses.
Economic analysis, of course, promises more than simply to organ-
ize. It also promises answers, very predictable answers if the author of
the analysis lists the University of Chicago in his resume.14 Outside of
Chicago, answers are more difficult to come by, although economic
analysis may lead to answers if coupled with a rigorous empiricism.
The value of a more theoretical economic analysis such as this one,
however, is not that it provides answers, but that it directs our atten-
tion to the justifications and consequences of minimal terms. It de-
fines the battleground, a battleground which might be quite different
than the traditional battleground.15
The battleground of law-and-economics, of course, has its own set
of controversial assumptions,' 6 particularly with respect to labor eco-
nomics.17 Although I do not believe that law-and-economics is the
11. See infra notes 29-36 and accompanying text.
12. See, ag., California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 107 S. Ct. 683 (1987); Alessi
v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504 (1981).
13. See, eg., Willborn, Employment Discrimination Laws in Nebraska,-A Procedural
Labyrinth (Parts 1 & 2), 62 NEB. L. REv. 225, 708 (1983).
14. See R. POsNER, ECONomc ANALYSIS OF LAW 306-15 (3d ed. 1986); Epstein, In De-
fense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. Cm. L. REv. 947 (1984); Landes, The Econom-
ics of Fair Employment Laws, 76 J. POL. ECON. 507, 548 (1968); M. FRIEDMAN,
CAPIALmsM AND FREEDOM 108-15, 180-89 (1962). See also Harrison, The New' Ter-
minable-at-Will Employment Contract. An Interest and Cost Incidence'Analysis,
69 IowA L. REv. 327 (1984).
15. See B. AcKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERIcAN LAW (1984).
16. There is a thriving literature which questions these assumptions. See, ag., Ken-
nedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L.
REv. 387 (1981); Baker, Starting Points in Economic Analysis of Law, 8 HOFSTRA
L. REv. 939 (1980); Kelman, Consumption Theory, Production Theory, and Ideol-
ogy in the Coase Theorem, 52 S. CAL. L. REv. 669 (1979); Kelman, Choice and
Utility, 1979 Wis. L. REv. 769; Heller, The Importance of Normative Decision-
making: The Limitations of Legal Economics as a Basis for a Liberal Jurispru-
dence-As Illustrated by the Regulation of Vacation Home Development, 1976
WIS. L. REV. 385; Baker, The Ideology of the Economic Analysis of Law, 5 PIL. &
PUB. AFF. 3 (1975).
17. A number of economists and sociologists believe that conventional neoclassical
analysis is unreliable when applied to the labor market because conventional neo-
classical analysis assumes a relatively flexible market while labor markets are
subject to institutional constraints which make them relatively rigid. See, e.g.,
UNFMPLOYMrr AND INFLATION: INSTITUTIONALIST AND STRuc'URALIsT VIEWs
(M. Piore ed. 1979); Beck, Horan & Tolbert, Stratification in a Dual Economy: A
Sectoral Model of Earnings Determination, 43 AM. Soc. REv. 704 (1978); Cain,
The Challenge of Segmented Labor Market Theories to Orthodox Theory: A Sur-
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only way, or necessarily even the best way, to analyze minimal terms
or that the neoclassical model is the best economic model to use when
analyzing minimal terms,18 I do not deal with those underlying as-
sumptions here. Rather, because law-and-economics is being used to
argue against such terms, I explore in this article the circumstances in
which the most common economic model can buttress rather than un-
dermine the case for minimal terms, while emphasizing that the ques-
tion is ultimately an empirical one.
II. PRICE THEORY, MINIMAL TERMS, AND
THE STANDARD OBJECTION
A. The Price Theory Model of the Labor Market
The price theory model 19 of the labor market is a specific instance
of the more general neoclassical economic model in which the price of
a commodity in a competitive market is determined by its supply and
demand. The price theory model describes how the labor market
would operate in a perfectly competitive environment. Although by
now the basic outline of the model should be familiar to most law-
yers,20 it may be helpful to begin by examining the model in broad
vey, 14 J. ECON. LIT. 1215 (1976); P. DOERINGER & M. PIORE, INTERNAL LABOR
MARKETS AND MANPOWER ANALYSIS (1971). For general and relatively nontech-
nical discussions, see L. THUROW, DANGEROUS CURRENTS: THE STATE OF ECONOM-
ics 173-215 (1983); WOMEN, WORK, AND WAGES: EQUAL PAY FOR JOBS OF EQUAL
VALUE 44-68 (D. Treiman & H. Hartmann eds. 1981) [hereinafter WOMEN, WORK,
AND WAGES].
18. See supra note 17. For articles which discuss the limitations of the neoclassical
model in the context of the equal pay debate, see Gregory, McMahon & Whit-
tingham, Women in the Australian Labor Force: Trends, Causes, and Conse-
quences, 3 J. LABOR ECON. 5293 (1985); Gregory & Duncan, Segmented Labor
Market Theories and the Australian Experience of Equal Pay for Women, 3 J.
POST KEYNESIAN EcoN. 403 (1981).
19. As pointed out by Professor Leslie, there is no consensus on the appropriate label
for this model of the labor market. Leslie, Labor Bargaining Units, 70 VA. L.
REV. 353, 360 n. 17 (1984). It has been described under a variety of labels. See,
e.g., H. WACHTEL, LABOR A1D THE ECONOMY 24 (1984) ("neoclassical theory of
wages"); Leslie, supra, at 360-64 ("the price theory model"); R. FEARN, LABOR
ECONOMICS: THE EMERGING SYNTHESIS 1-3 (1981) ("the classical-neoclassical ap-
proach"); L. THUROW, GENERATING INEQUALITY viii (1975) ("marginal-productiv-
ity theory"). Sometimes it is just not given a name. See, e.g., B. FLEISHER & T.
KNEISNER, LABOR ECONOMICS: THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND POLICY (1984); A. CART-
TER & F. MARSHALL, LABOR ECONOMICS: WAGES, EMPLOYMENT, AND TRADE
UNIoNIsM (1967). I, like Leslie, will call it the "price theory model."
20. Economic analysis of the law is very common and the basic model has been de-
scribed in innumerable law review articles, both generally, see, e.g., R. POSNER,
supra note 14, at 3-15; Markovits, The Causes and Policy Significance of Pareto
Resource Misallocation: A Checklist for Micro-Economic Policy Analysis, 28
STAN. L. REV. 1 (1975) [hereinafter Causes and Policy], and specifically with re-
spect to labor law. See, e.g., Campbell, Labor Law and Economics, 38 STAN. L.
REV. 991, 1004-1005 (1986); Donohue, Is Title VII Efficient?, 134 U. PA. L. REV.
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relief.
Under the price theory model, the supply of labor and the demand
for labor determine the equilibrium wage and the quantity of labor
utilized. A basic understanding of labor supply and demand, then, is
essential to an understanding of the price theory model.
As indicated in Figure 1,21 the demand curve for labor generally
slopes downward.22 That is, assuming a fixed supply of capital, the
marginal value of each unit of labor to employers declines as the quan-
tity of labor utilized by employers increases. The downward slope of
the demand curve for labor makes sense intuitively. Consider, for ex-
ample, the demand for manual labor to dig a ditch.23 One worker us-
ing a large shovel may be able to dig 100 feet per day; two workers
using medium-sized shovels24 might be able to complete 150 feet per
day; three workers with tiny shovels might be able to complete 180
feet per day; and so on until there are many men with small trowels.
The marginal product of each unit of labor decreases as more units of
labor are added, assuming once again that capital is held constant.
The marginal product of the first worker is 100 feet, of the second
worker fifty feet, of the third worker thirty feet, and so on. Employer
demand for labor depends on the marginal product of labor. An em-
ployer might be willing to pay the first worker the equivalent of 100
feet of ditch (the first worker's marginal product), but the second
worker is only worth the equivalent of fifty feet of ditch, the third
worker only thirty feet, and so on.25 If we graphed this phenomenon,
1411, 1412-15 (1986); Leslie, supra note 19, at 360-64; Posner, Some Economics of
Labor Law, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 988 (1984).
21. My experience has been that figures in law-and-economics articles interfere with
comprehension at least as often as they improve comprehension. Nevertheless,
they do improve comprehension on occasion, so I have decided to use them
sparingly.
22. The demand and supply curves in this article are drawn as straight lines for
convenience.
23. This example is adapted from A. CARER & F. MARSHALL, supra note 19, at 231
and A. REES, THE EcoNoMIcs OF WORK AND PAY 60 (2d ed. 1979).
24. The size of the shovels must be reduced to hold constant the amount of capital
utilized. An important assumption of the downward sloping demand for labor is
that capital is fixed in the short run. In most cases, however, the demand curve
for labor would slope downward, and would not be vertical or horizontal, even if
the form of the capital was less flexible. Assume that one large shovel constitutes
the stock of capital and that it cannot be exchanged for smaller shovels. The first
worker would still be able to dig 100 feet of ditch per day. Even with only one
shovel, the second worker would have a positive marginal product (but one which
is less than the first worker's marginal product) which would result in a down-
ward sloping demand curve. She could, for example, use the shovel when the first
worker was tired or fan the first worker or bring the first worker refreshments,
so together the two workers could dig, say, 125 feet per day.
25. At a certain point for any given input of capital, of course, the marginal product
of labor is zero; workers begin to interfere with each other or do not have the






the marginal product for ditch diggers (which would determine the
demand for that type of labor) would slope downward like the demand
curve in Figure 1.26
The supply curve for labor indicates the quantity of labor that is
available at a particular wage rate. The supply curve for labor gener-
ally slopes upward, as indicated in Figure 1. Once again, the slope is
intuitively sensible because a higher wage would tend to encourage
workers to work more hours and to encourage non-workers to enter
the labor force.27
26. The downward slope of the demand curve for labor is one application of an im-
portant principle of economics-the law of diminishing returns. The law of di-
minishing returns states that as one adds units of one factor (labor in the
example) to a fixed input of another factor (capital), the variable factor will pro-
duce diminishing marginal returns. See R. LIPSEY & P. STEINER, ECONOMICS 190-
92 (6th ed. 1981); L. REYNOLDS, LABOR ECONOMICS AND LABOR RELATIONS 86-87
(7th ed. 1978).
27. Economists call this phenomenon the substitution effect. Individuals choose how
much to work by weighing the advantages of work against the advantages of lei-
sure (which I use here to mean any activity other than work). When an individ-
ual decides not to work, the individual in effect has decided that the value of that
amount of leisure time is worth more than the wages she could receive by work-
ing. An increase in the wage rate may tip the balance. After the increase, the
wage may be worth more than the leisure time. As a result, the individual may
[Vol. 67:101
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The intersection of the demand curve and the supply curve deter-
mines the equilibrium wage and quantity of labor employed. (See Fig-




that that level is the only stable position. Employers have no incen-
tive to pay more than the equilibrium wage; as Figure 3 illustrates,
they can attract sufficient labor to meet their demand at W1. Indeed,
the employer demand for labor at a higher wage, W2, is only Q3. Since
there is an excess supply of labor at that wage level, (with Q willing to
work, but employers only willing to hire Q3), workers will be unem-
ployed, which should result in competition between workers for the
available jobs, which should drive the wage down toward W1, the equi-
substitute work time for leisure time and, hence, increase the amount of time she
devotes to labor activities. Portions of the supply curve may also be backward
bending. That is, the supply of labor may decrease as the wage rate increases. If
workers are already satisfied with the income they are receiving, an increase in
the wage rate may lead them to reduce the amount of time they devote to work.
They can earn the same amount working less hours and, thus, have more time











librium wage. In much the same way, as indicated in Figure 4, if em-
ployers pay a lower-than-equilibrium wage, employers will demand Q2
workers, but only Q workers will be available. The resulting competi-
tion between employers for the available workers should drive the
wage up toward W1. As a result, when wages are higher or lower than
equilibrium, there are forces which drive the wages toward equilib-
rium. In contrast, when wages are at the equilibrium level, these
forces are absent. The equilibrium wage is stable because, at that
wage, employers can hire the optimal amount of labor given the de-
mand for their products, while workers can optimally balance their
demands for work and leisure.
This formal and bloodless picture of the labor market describes
only how the market would operate in a perfectly competitive envi-
ronment. In such an environment, employers and workers would
have full, perfect and costless knowledge of the market, including in-
formation on wage rates and job openings; employers and workers
would be entirely rational, with employers attempting to maximize
their profits and workers responding to wage differences and attempt-
ing to optimally balance their desires for work and leisure; there
would be no externalities; workers would be perfectly mobile and able
to change jobs without any costs, and would not act in concert; and







none would be so large that its decisions would affect the market as a
whole.28 Obviously, these conditions are seldom, if ever, met. Never-
theless, the model is a useful starting point for discussion. When the
conditions affect the analysis, as they inevitably do, the discussion can
be advanced by easing the conditions.
B. Minimal Terms and the Standard Objection
Minimal terms are nonwaivable, minimum substantive terms of
employment which are required by the government. They come in a
wide variety of forms. The government might require employers to
pay minimum wages, 29 to provide a certain level of maternity rights,30
28. See, e.g., A. CARTTER & F. ARSHALL, supra note 19, at 201; Leslie, supra note 19,
at 361; Markovits, A Basic Structure for Microeconomic Policy Analysis in our
Worse-Than-Second-Best World- A Proposal and Related Critique of the Chicago
Approach to the Study of Law and Economics, 1975 WIs. L. REv. 950, 961-62 [here-
inafter Basic Structure].
29. Minimum wages are currently required by the federal government, Fair Labor
Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982), and by 41 states. [4A State Laws] Lab.
Rel. Rep. (BNA) 1:19 (1987).
30. A number of states require employers to provide at least some maternity benefits.
For a recent survey, see Dowd, Maternity Leave: Taking Sex Differences Into Ac-
count, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 699, 720-35 (1986).
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to provide a safe workplace,3 1 to supply information about plant clos-
ings,3 2 to pay severance pay,33 to make certain provisions for retire-
ment3 4 and possible unemployment,3 5 to provide a certain level of
health insurance,3 6 and so on.
In the abstract, effective 37 minimal terms provide a benefit to
workers and impose a cost on employers. All other things being equal,
when a minimal term is added to the wage package, both the wage cost
to the employer and the effective wages of the workers go up.38 Mini-
31. The most well-known statute requiring a safe workplace is the federal Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1982). Most states also have
laws requiring safe workplaces. See generally Facilities for Employees section for
each state in [4 State Laws] Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) (1987).
32. Four states currently require employers to provide notice of plant closings.
Maryland, MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 7-304(b) (1986); Massachusetts, MASS. GEN.
LAws ANN. ch. 149, § 179B (West 1982); South Carolina, S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-1-40
(Law Co-op 1986); and Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 109.07 (West Supp. 1987). In
addition, a number of municipalities require notice, see, e.g., PliLADELPHIA, PA.,
CODE ch. 9-1500 (1986), as do bills currently in Congress. Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act of 1987, S. 1420, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., Title XXII, § 2202
(1987); Economic Dislocation and Worker Adjustment Assistance Act, S. 538,
100th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 201-08 (1987); Labor-Management Notification and Con-
sultation Act, H.R. 1484, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 1-10 (1987). See generally
Brown, How Often Do Workers Receive Advance Notice of Layoffs?, 110
MONTHLY LAB. REv. 13 (1987) (about one out of three workers surveyed received
advance general notice of layoff; on average, when notice was given, it was pro-
vided 46 days in advance of the layoff).
33. Maine currently requires employers to pay severance pay to workers under cer-
tain conditions. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 625 B (Supp. 1986). See Fort Hali-
fax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 107 S. Ct. 2211 (1987) (Maine severance pay statute is
not preempted by either Employee Retirement Income Security Act or National
Labor Relations Act).
34. See, e.g., Federal Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance Benefits (Social
Security) Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-433 (1982); Employee Retirement Income Security
Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1982).
35. For a general review of the unemployment insurance system, see Price, Unem-
ployment Insurance, Then and Now, 1935-85, 48 SOcIAL. SEC. BULL, No. 2 Oct.
1985, at 22.
36. A bill currently in Congress would require employers to provide a minimal pack-
age of health insurance for all workers. Minimum Health Benefits for All Work-
ers Act, S. 1265, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
37. By "effective" minimal terms, I am referring to minimal terms that are set above
the market level. Minimal terms which are set at or below market levels would
not have any effect on the market. If, for example, a minimum wage law requires
wages of at least x dollars per hour but the market already pays more than x
dollars per hour, the minimum wage would not effectively raise wages and so it
would not have the market effects described in the text. Minimal terms set at or
below market levels are not subject to the standard economic objection described
in this section.
38. In this section, to facilitate a discussion of the standard objection to minimal
terms, I have simplified the economic effects of minimal terms by analogizing
them to exogenous wage increases. The analogy is quite accurate for some mini-
mal terms (e.g., minimum wage laws), but less so for others (in particular, mini-
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mal terms, at least in the short run, are the equivalent of a wage
increase. 39
The standard objection to minimal terms, then, begins with a con-
sideration of the effects of an exogenous wage increase (i.e., a wage
increase that is not the result of changes in labor supply or demand)
on the labor market. The effects in the short run should be as indi-
cated in Figure 5. The intersection of the supply and demand curves
mal terms which have different values placed on them by employers and
workers). The analogy serves quite well, however, for the purpose of presenting
the standard objection. In a later section, the economic effects of minimal terms
are discussed in a more sophisticated fashion. See infra note 70.
39. I do not include laws that prohibit discrimination within my definition of minimal
terms. Even though discrimination laws can be viewed as governmentally re-
quired substantive terms of employment, I do not include them as minimal terms
because they are economically distinct from minimal terms as I have defined
them. To illustrate, consider a law which prohibits race discrimination and,
hence, which requires a discriminatory employer to hire blacks. In contrast to
minimal terms, the antidiscrimination law should not increase the discriminatory
employer's labor costs, nor should it increase the effective wages of workers. In-
deed, the cost of labor should be driven downward because the law expands the
pool of potential workers and because black workers who face discrimination
may be willing to work for less than white workers who have more opportunities.
It can be argued, however, that antidiscrimination laws actually do increase
the labor costs of discriminatory employers. Even though the money wages paid
by employers to workers may not increase because of an antidiscrimination law,
the actual wage costs to employers do go up. The actual wage costs to employers
include the money wages they pay to workers and the value they place on satisfy-
ing their taste for discrimination. Thus, a discriminatory employer might be will-
ing to pay five for white workers even though he could employ black workers for
four because he places a value of three on satisfying his taste for discrimination
against blacks. That is, the actual cost to the discriminatory employer of employ-
ing white workers is five (five in money wages plus zero because he has no taste
for discrimination against whites), while the actual cost of employing black work-
ers is seven (four in money wages plus three because his taste for discrimination
against blacks has been frustrated). If an antidiscrimination law requires the em-
ployer to hire black workers, the money wages paid by the employer should stay
the same or even drift downward, but the actual labor costs of the employer (in-
cluding frustration of his taste for discrimination) would go up. See generally G.
BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION (2d ed. 1971). Even if this is true, of
course, antidiscrimination laws are distinct from minimal terms because minimal
terms increase both the cost of labor to employers and the effective wages of
workers, while antidiscrimination laws increase the cost of labor to employers
without raising the effective wages of workers.
In an important sense, then, antidiscrimination laws are the economic oppo-
sites of minimal terms. Minimal terms increase the cost of labor creating a de-
crease in demand, see infra figure 5 and accompanying text, while
antidiscrimination laws reduce the cost of labor creating an increase in demand.
Antidiscrimination laws are economically distinct from minimal terms and re-
quire a distinct analysis. I do not undertake it here. For economic analyses of
antidiscrimination laws, see G. BECKER, supra; 0. ASHENFELTER & A. REES, DIs-
CRIMINATION IN LABOR MARKETS (1973); F. BLAU & M. FERBER, THE ECONOMICS
OF WOMEN, MEN, AND WORK (1986).
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determines the equilibrium wage, W1. A minimal term imposed by the
government would have the effect of a wage increase, raising the wage
to W 2. The wage increase, in turn, would result in a reduction in the
quantity of labor utilized from Q, to Q3. One part of the standard ob-
jection to minimal terms, then, is that minimal terms do not confer
any benefits on workers as a class. Any benefits received by one set of
workers are paid for (and often more than paid for) by other work-
ers40 in unemployment.4 1
The effects of minimal terms illustrated in Figure 5, however, are
not stable. The excess supply of labor creates competition between
workers for the available jobs and, as a result, tends to force the wage
level back down to equilibrium.42 Whether the wage actually moves
back to (or at least closer to) the equilibrium level depends on
40. The reduction in the quantity of employment can occur in a variety of forms.
Employers may lay workers off, refuse to hire workers they otherwise would
have hired, reduce the hours of workers, fail to increase the hours of workers,
and so on. Thus, in some circumstances (e.g., when employers reduce the hours
of workers), workers may pay for their own minimal terms in reduced work-
time. In addition, the variety in the ways in which the quantity of labor may be
reduced means that the reduction may not appear in the unemployment statistics.
See F. WELCH, MINIMUM WAGES: ISSUES AND EVIDENCE 23-24, 44 (1978). Never-
theless, for ease of reference, I will refer to the reduction in the quantity of em-
ployment as unemployment.
41. This objection does not necessarily mean that minimal terms are a bad idea. De-
pending on the slopes of the demand and supply curves, the gains from the mini-
mal term (in Figure 5, the area enclosed by W1W2ab) may outweigh the losses
caused by the reduction in the quantity of labor utilized (the area enclosed by
QIQ3 bc). With perfect competition, the winners could compensate the losers and
everyone could be better off.
Under more realistic conditions, however, this objection retains its force. The
example in the text assumes that workers are indistinguishable in quality. If, as
seems more realistic, worker productivity lies on a continuum, a minimal term
that raised wages and reduced employment would result in higher-quality work-
ers retaining their jobs and receiving the benefits of the higher wage and lower-
quality workers losing their jobs. Consequently, if one considers the pool of low-
wage workers who might be affected by a minimal term, the benefits would flow
to those who least need them and the costs would be assessed against those who
need them most. The empirical evidence, which suggests that the harshest im-
pact of minimum wage laws is on the young, and particularly the black young,
tends to support this view. See F. WELCH, supra note 40; Welch, Minimum-Wage
Legislation in the United States in 0. ASHENFELTER & J. BLUM, EVALUATING THE
LABOR MARKET EFFECTS OF SOCIAL PROGRAMS 1-45 (1976). But see H. WACHTEL,
supra note 19, at 453-477.
42. Note that the excess supply of labor created by the minimal term is greater than
the reduction in employment caused by the minimal term. The reduction in em-
ployment caused by the minimal term is the difference between Q, and Q3, which
is the difference between the quantity of labor required with the effective wage
increase and the quantity of labor required at the equilibrium wage. The excess
supply of labor includes the reduction in employment just described and the
quantity of labor between Q2 and Q1, which is the quantity of labor which is avail-









whether the employer can avoid the minimal term which effectively
raised the wage level by making a compensating change in another
part of the wage package. That is, an employer may be able to avoid a
minimal term by offsetting the effective wage increase caused by the
minimal term with an effective wage decrease in another part of the
wage package.43 For example, a minimal term requiring employers to
pay workers for maternity or paternity leave would be avoidable if
employers reduced the wages of workers by an amount equivalent to
the cost of the required leave program. Some minimal terms may not
be avoidable. Minimum wage laws, for example, effectively apply only
to low-wage, low-benefit jobs, so offsetting the wage increase by an
sizes of the reduction in employment and the excess supply of labor depend on
the slopes of the demand and supply curves. See A. REES, supra note 23, at 63-64.
Note also that in a more sophisticated economic model of the effects of mini-
mal terms, the wage level is likely to move downward in these circumstances, but
to a new rather than to the old equilibium. See supra note 38 and infra note 70.
43. Compensating changes should be distinguished from nonwaivability, which will
be discussed later. See infra notes 47-60 and accompanying text. Minimal terms,
by definition, are non-waivable. That is, they must be included in the wage pack-
age; workers and employers cannot agree to omit them. Minimal terms, however,
can be avoided through compensating changes, that is, through wage decreases
elsewhere in the wage package. Thus, even though minimal terms are included in
the wage package, compensating changes can nullify their effect.
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effective wage decrease in another part of the wage package may not
be possible. Most minimal terms, however, should be avoidable, at
least in the long run. Even if employers cannot make compensating
changes immediately, as in the maternity or paternity leave exam-
ple,44 they should be able to do so in the long run, for example, by
reducing the rate of increase in wages.45 When minimal terms are
avoidable through compensating changes, wages and quantity of labor
should tend to move back to equilibrium.
Another part of the standard objection to minimal terms, then, is
that workers and employers will find ways to counteract the desired
effects of minimal terms and, indeed, that there are economic forces
which drive the parties to do so. Since minimal terms are effective
wage increases, they can be counteracted by actual or effective wage
decreases in other parts of the wage package. The excess supply of
labor encourages the counteraction.
A corollary of this objection is that when wages and quantity of
labor move back to equilibrium in reaction to a minimal term, both
employers and workers are worse off than they would have been if the
minimal term had never been imposed. Using the maternity or pater-
nity leave example again, if the wages and quantity of labor move back
to equilibrium, the overall wage package is worth the same as the
overall wage package before the minimal term was imposed, but its
components are different. Before the minimal term, the package pro-
vided no maternity or paternity leave, but a higher wage; after the
minimal term was imposed, the package provided maternity or pater-
nity leave, but a lower wage. By hypothesis, the ex post position
leaves the parties worse off. In a world with perfect competition, if
the parties had wanted that wage package, they would have bargained
for it ex ante. Since they did not, imposition of the minimal term frus-
trates the wage package preferred by the parties.46
The standard economic objection to minimal terms, then, is that
any perceived benefits to workers are merely illusory. Because imposi-
tion of minimal terms is the equivalent of a wage increase and because
an exogenous wage increase reduces the demand for labor, any bene-
fits to workers from minimum terms in the short run are paid for by
other workers in unemployment. In the long run, minimal terms can
44. Employers may not be able to offset the costs of minimal terms immediately for a
variety of institutional reasons. For example, they may be parties to collective
bargaining agreements which restrict their ability to make adjustments.
45. Governmental attempts to limit the avoidability of minimal terms are likely to be
unsuccessful because of high monitoring costs. There are a large number of
terms in the ordinary employment contract, it would be difficult for the govern-
ment to monitor changes in the terms, and it would be difficult to link changes in
terms to imposition of minimal terms.
46. See generally Sunstein, Rights, Minimal Terms, and Solidarity: A Comment, 51
U. CHI. L. REV. 1041, 1051-52 (1984).
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usually be avoided by offsetting the effective wage increase from im-
position of the minimal terms with wage decreases elsewhere in the
wage package. When minimal terms are avoided, employers and
workers are worse off than they would have been if minimal terms
had not been required in the first place.
C. An Aside on Waivable Terms
In contrast to minimal terms, the government may establish terms
of employment which are waivable by the parties. In most circum-
stances, waivable terms are gap fillers; they are terms which will be
implied if the parties have not spoken on an issue. Thus, the govern-
ment may say that if the agreement between the parties does not es-
tablish termination rules, an "at-will" provision will be read into the
agreement. Or, in the same situation, the government might say that
a "for cause" provision will be read into the agreement. In either case,
so long as the parties can modify the term by contract (i.e., so long as
the term is waivable), the government's action is not subject to the
standard economic objection. Examining why the standard economic
objection does not apply in this situation tells us something about
waivable terms, but it also sheds light on the nature of the standard
economic objection to minimal terms.
To explore the difference between waivable terms and minimal
terms, consider the example concerning termination rules. The two
government positions assign the right to terminate differently. An
"at-will" provision allocates the right entirely to employers, while a
"for cause" provision allocates at least a portion of the right to work-
ers.47 Regardless of which government position is adopted, if the pro-
vision is waivable and there are no transaction costs, the right should
end up in the hands of the party who values it more highly. Say that
the employer values the right to terminate at ten, while the workers
value the right to avoid termination at five.48 Since the employer val-
47. Even under a "for cause" provision, employers could terminate workers for cer-
tain "good" reasons, such as worker misconduct or a reduction in the employer's
need for labor. Workers would be able to avoid termination, however, if employ-
ers attempted to terminate them in the absence of these "good" reasons.
48. To say that a waivable term will end up with the party who values it most highly
regardless of the government's assignment is not to say that the right will end up
with the same party regardless of the government's assignment. If people value
goods which they possess more highly than they value other goods (that is, if
people demand more to give up a good in hand than they would pay to acquire
that good), the government's initial assignment of the right may affect the par-
ties' valuation of the right. Kelman, Consumption Theory, Production Theory,
and Ideology in the Coase Theorem, 52 S. CAL L. REV. 669 (1979); Sunstein, Legal
Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. Cml. L. REV. 1129, 1150-52 (1986).
But see Spitzer & Hoffman, A Reply to Consumption Theory, Production Theory,
and Ideology in the Coase Theorem, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 1187, 1198-99 (1980);
Schwab, Collective Bargaining and the Coase Theorem, 72 CoRNELL L. REv. 245,
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ues the right more highly than the workers, the workers will not be
able to buy it from the employer if the right is initially assigned to him
(they would only be willing to offer five for a right that the employer
values at ten), but he should be able to buy it from the workers if the
right is initially assigned to them (he can offer up to ten for a right
that they value at only five). 49 Thus, when the employer values the
right more highly, he should acquire the right regardless of the initial
assignment of the right by the government. The converse, of course, is
also true; if the workers value the right more highly than the em-
ployer, they should acquire the right regardless of the initial
assignment.50
Waivable terms, if used and understood in this way, should not in-
terfere with the labor market. In initially assigning the right, the gov-
ernment should attempt to predict the bargain the parties would have
reached had they considered the issue.5 ' If the government initially
assigns the termination right to employers, it is judging that employ-
ers value the right more highly than workers. Even if the govern-
ment's judgment is wrong and workers value the right more highly,
the initial assignment does not interfere with the market because, if
that is the case, the workers can buy the right from employers. A
perfectly functioning labor market would allocate rights to the parties
275-77 (1987). Since the valuations might change depending on the initial assign-
ment of the right, it is possible that the right will always end up with the party
who values it most highly and that it may end up with a different party depend-
ing on the initial assignment.
49. Economists might describe this by referring to opportunity costs. If the right is
initially assigned to the workers, the cost to them of exercising the right is the
highest valued alternative (or opportunity) that is lost through that exercise. So if
the employer values the right more highly, the workers gain x by exercising their
right not to be terminated (when x is the value workers place on their right not to
be terminated), but they give up more than x because they have lost their oppor-
tunity to sell the right to the employer who places a higher value on it. Because
of this opportunity cost, then, the workers would be better off to sell the right to
terminate to the employer rather than to exercise their right to avoid
termination.
50. This, of course, is merely an application of the Coase Theorem which holds that,
in the absence of transaction costs, rights will ultimately be allocated to the party
that most highly values them, regardless of their initial assignment. Coase, The
Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & ECON. 1 (1960). For a brief discussion of the
concept, see C. GOETZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAW AND ECONOMICS 51-55
(1984). For a recent criticism of the concept, see White, Coase and the Courts:
Economics for the Common Man, 72 IOWA L. REV. 577 (1987).
51. Waivable terms may result in an efficiency gain if the goverment makes an accu-
rate prediction because the parties would be spared the time and expense of nego-
tiating and drafting a provision on that topic. Kronman, Paternalism and the
Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763, 766-67 (1983). On the other hand, there
should be no efficiency loss if the government makes an erroneous prediction
because then the parties would be in the same position (except for bargaining
endowments) they would have been in if the waivable term did not exist.
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who value them most highly. Waivable terms do not interfere with
the labor market, because they reach the same result.
Minimal terms, in contrast, may require that a right be left with a
party who values it less. If the government assigns the termination
right to workers even though employers value it more highly, the min-
imal term would interfere with the market. That is, it would frustrate
the bargain the parties would prefer. To illustrate, assume once again
that the employer values the termination right at ten and the workers
value it at five. A minimal term requiring the right to be held by the
workers would frustrate the preferred bargain because both the em-
ployer and the workers would prefer a different arrangement. Both
parties would see themselves as better off if the workers could sell the
termination right to the employer and receive between six and nine
from the employer in return.
One part of the standard economic objection is that minimal terms
prevent the parties from reaching the arrangement which best accom-
modates their preferences. Waivable rights are not subject to this part
of the standard objection because, to the extent they are not consistent
with the parties' desires, the parties may override them.
The other major part of the standard objection to minimal terms is
that they interfere with the overall functioning of the labor market.
Minimal terms are the equivalent of an exogenous increase in wages,
which should lead to a reduction in the quantity of labor demanded.52
Viewed in isolation, one would also expect waivable rights to be sub-
ject to this part of the objection. The government's initial assignment
of a right should affect the distribution of income between workers
and employers.53 Assume, for example, that the employer has a total
pool of resources of 100 and values the termination right at ten, while
the workers have a total pool of resources of 100 and value the termi-
nation right at five. If the government assigns the termination right to
the employer, the right should stay with the employer (the workers
will be unable to buy it from him), so the employer's total pool of re-
sources will be 110 and the workers' total pool of resources will be 100.
If the government assigns the termination right to workers, the em-
ployer should be able to purchase the right for an amount between six
and nine. Assume the employer purchases the right for eight. The
employer's total pool of resources then would be 102 (his initial pool of
100, plus the 10 from possession of the termination right, minus the
eight paid to the workers) and the workers' total pool of resources
would be 108.
Thus, viewed in isolation, a change in the assignment of the right
from the employer to the workers is the equivalent of an exogenous
52. See supra figure 5 and accompanying text.
53. See Coase, supra note 50, at 2-8.
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wage increase, while a change in the assignment of the right from
workers to the employer is the equivalent of an exogenous wage de-
crease. In either event, the change in assignment of the right would
affect the overall functioning of the labor market. The wage increase
or decrease would cause a corresponding decrease or increase, respec-
tively, in the demand for labor.54
Once again, however, these short term changes in the labor market
would not be stable. Shortages or excesses in the supply of labor
should drive the wages back towards the original equilibrium.55 The
route back is likely to be through compensating changes. Assume, for
example, that the government has re-assigned termination rights from
employers to workers. Using the same numbers as before, the workers
should receive a short-term increase of eight. But since that would
create an oversupply of labor, the competition between workers
should drive the wage back down to equilibrium. The most direct
method of return5 6 would be for the employer to make a compensat-
ing change by reducing the money wages portion of the wage package
by eight. In a situation where compensating changes can be made,
then, the government's assignment or reassignment of waivable rights
should not alter the distribution of income between employers and
workers57 and, as a result, should not adversely affect the overall func-
tioning of the labor market.
Thus, waivable rights, like minimal terms, would adversely affect
the overall functioning of the labor market only when compensating
changes could not be made.5 8 The ability to make compensating
changes, however, should be greater with waivable rights than with
minimal terms. With minimal terms, the compensating changes must
be made in portions of the wage package outside of the minimal term
itself.5 9 With waivable rights, the right itself can be molded to bring
the total wage package closer to equilibrium.60 Thus, although there
may be circumstancds in which compensating changes cannot be made
54. See supra figures 3 & 4 and accompanying text.
55. See supra figures 3 & 4 and accompanying text.
56. Because the wage package contains a large number of terms, there is a wide vari-
ety in the types of compensating changes that could be made to return the overall
wage to the equilibrium level.
57. Several commentators have made this point in other contexts. See Demsetz,
Wealth Distribution and the Ownership of Rights, 1 J. LEGAL STuD. 223 (1972);
Demsetz, When Does the Rule of Liability Matter?, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 13 (1972);
Leslie, supra note 19, at 370-72; Schwab, supra note 48, at 262-65.
58. See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
59. By definition, the minimal term is nonwaivable and, hence, must be included in
the wage package as is.
60. With termination rights, for example, there is a broad continuum of possible
rights, ranging from an unfettered right to discharge vested in the employer to an
unfettered right to resist discharge vested in the worker. The valuations of these
possible rights by the employer and workers would vary as one moved along the
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so that waivable rights would have an affect on the overall functioning
of the labor market, that should occur less often with waivable rights
than with minimal terms.
III. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR MINIMAL TERMS WITHIN THE
PRICE THEORY MODEL
Employers and individual workers face a difficult problem when
they wish to enter into a relationship. A number of uncertainties exist
which may affect the relationship-uncertainties about the precise
work the employer needs done, the ability of the worker to perform it,
the employer's long-term need for the work, other work opportunities
which may present themselves to the worker, the worker's continued
good health, the safety of the workplace, and so on. The proposed re-
lationship is also quite complex-what arrangements should be made
for the worker's retirement, for the possibility of a work-related in-
jury, for health insurance, and so on.6 1
Minimal terms can be viewed as a set of ready-made contract terms
which deal with many of these difficult issues. The government, for
example, requires a certain minimum amount to be set aside for re-
tirement6 2 and requires certain safeguards if greater amounts are re-
served.63 To the extent the parties would have included the same or
very similar terms in the employment contract even if they had not
been required by the government, the minimal terms are efficient.
They spare the parties the time and expense of having to negotiate the
terms. This effect of minimal terms should be uncontroversial.64
Governments generally enact minimal terms, however, not merely
to save transaction costs, but to change the substance of the employ-
ment arrangement. That is precisely why minimal terms are nonwaiv-
able. It is this goal-to change the employment contract-which runs
into the standard objection. When minimal terms are required and
they change the arrangments the parties would otherwise have made,
the standard objection leads to the conclusion that the parties are nec-
essarily made worse off.
This section considers circumstances in which minimal terms
continuum, so compensating changes could be made within the waivable term
itself by moving in one direction or the other along the continuum.
61. Because of this uncertainty and complexity, employment contracts are generally
relational, that is, the parties are not able to reduce important terms of the ar-
rangement to well-defined obligations. See Goetz & Scott, Principles of Rela-
tional Contracts, 67 VA. L. REv. 1089 & n.1 (1981).
62. Federal Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance Benefits (Social Security)
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-433 (1982). It may, of course, be more appropriate to view
the old age benefits of the social security program as a straight transfer program
from workers to retired persons.
63. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1982).
64. See Sunstein, supra note 46, at 1052-53; Kronman, supra note 51, at 766-67.
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might not be subject to the standard objection but, rather, may en-
hance efficiency or lead to a more desirable distribution of resources.
A. Efficiency65 Justifications
1. Collective Terms
Some terms of employment are collective in nature; that is, if they
are supplied to one worker, they must also be supplied to other work-
ers.66 Terms may be collective by their very nature or they may be
collective for practical reasons. Health and safety terms, for example,
are often collective by their very nature. If an employer supplies clean
air or good lighting to one worker, other workers are usually able to
share in the benefits.67 More often, however, terms are collective for
practical reasons. When workers work together closely, an eight hour
day for one worker may mean an eight hour day for other workers.
When one worker demands and receives a new vending machine in
the cafeteria, it is likely that other workers will be allowed to use it.
When an employer establishes a disciplinary system for a few work-
ers, it may be efficient to use it for all workers.68
65. By efficiency, I mean that a minimal term gives its beneficiaries the equivalent of
more dollars than the term takes away from its victims; in simple terms,
efficiency means that the economic pie has gotten larger. Causes and Policy,
supra note 20, at 2-3; Basic Structure, supra note 28 at 955-58. For my purposes, I
need not deal with the problems of operationalizing this definition. Id. at 956-58 &
n.8.
66. The key element of a collective term, then, is nonexcludability: it must be impos-
sible or impractical for an employer to exclude non-paying workers from using
the term if the employer supplies it to one worker. See M. OLSON, THE LOGIC OF
COLLEcTIvE ACTION 14-15 & n.21 (1965). Other, more restrictive definitions of
collective terms have been proposed. Poulson and Head, for example, would re-
quire both nonexcludability and unlimited joint consumption (i.e., additional use
of the benefits of the term by one individual would not reduce the benefits avail-
able to others). Poulson, Is Collective Bargaining a Collective Good?, 4 J. LAB.
RES. 349 (1983); Head, Public Goods and Public Policy, 17 PUB. FIN. 197 (1962).
For my purpose, which is merely to demonstrate that minimal terms can improve
efficiency, this difference in definitions is not important. Although a more re-
strictive definition would mean that the absolute number of minimal terms which
can be justified on this basis would be reduced, the ability to justify minimal
terms with this rationale is not affected.
67. This type of collective term, in many instances, should be able to satisfy even
fairly strict definitions. See supra note 66. With a term requiring clean air, for
example, it would be difficult to exclude non-paying workers from the benefits
and additional use of the clean air by one worker should not decrease the amount
of clean air available to other workers.
68. More generally, minimal terms are collective for practical reasons where the cost
of providing the benefits of the term to additional workers is low (even though
the cost of initialing providing the term might be high) or where the costs of
collection for the benefits of the term outweigh the revenues which would be
received.
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Collective terms69 are likely to be underproduced. That is, the
terms will often not be offered even though the cost to the employer
of providing the terms is less than the value the workers place on the
benefits of the terms. To illustrate why this is the case, consider an
employer who employs ten workers and who could install Equipment
A at a cost of one, which would clean the air in the plant a bit or
Equipment B at a cost of twenty, which could clean the air in the plant
quite a bit. Assume that each worker would value the cleaner air pro-
duced by Equipment A at two and the cleaner air produced by Equip-
ment B at five (i.e., each worker would be willing to accept a reduction
in pay of two and five, respectively, in return for the cleaner air).7o
From an efficiency standpoint, the employer should install Equipment
B. At a marginal cost of nineteen, the employer can produce cleaner
air with a marginal value of thirty (see Table A); both the employer
and the workers would be better off if the employer installed Equip-
ment B and reduced the workers' aggregate wages by an amount be-
tween twenty and twenty-nine.
Because of strategic behavior and information imperfections, how-
ever, Equipment B will not always be installed and, indeed, even
Equipment A may not be installed in some instances. Consider the
calculations of each individual worker who is deciding whether to ac-
cept lower wages for cleaner air. Clearly the best outcome for an indi-
vidual worker would be to refuse to accept lower wages, but to have
the equipment installed because other workers accepted lower wages.
69. I use the phrase "collective terms" to refer to terms of employment that provide
collective goods-benefits which by their nature must be supplied to the group if
they are supplied to one worker.
70. In this situation, then, the employer and the workers place different values on
the minimal term. As a result, the simple economic model used to present the
standard objection is not sufficiently sophisticated to describe the situation. See
supra note 38. Figures 6 and 7 graphically present a more sophisticated economic
model to illustrate the efficiency consequences of installing Equipment A. Figure
6 presents the situation without Equipment A. The size of area ABC represents
the efficiency gains from the situation. (Area ABC represents the difference be-
tween the total income derived from employing that quantity of labor--area
OCBQ--and the minimum amount of wages that would have been necessary to
induce workers to devote that amount of time to work rather than to leisure-
area OABQ. The allocation of the gains between the employer and the workers
depends on the slopes of the supply and demand curves. See infra note 110.)
Figure 7 presents the situation with Equipment A installed. The demand curve
for labor has shifted downward by an amount equal to the cost of installing
Equipment A, from D to D1 ; the employer is willing to pay less for labor with
Equipment A because of the cost of installing the equipment. At the same time,
the supply curve shifts by an amount equal to the value workers place on Equip-
ment A, from S to S,; workers are willing to work for less because they value the
cleaner air produced by Equipment A. Because the shift in the supply curve is
greater than the shift in the demand curve, area ABC is larger than area ABC.
Installing Equipment A has resulted in an efficiency gain. See Harrison, supra
note 14, at 335-37.
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the benefits of the clean air,71 but would not have to pay for it. If all of
the workers engaged in this type of strategic behavior, neither Equip-
ment A nor Equipment B would be installed.72 Thus, one reason the
efficient outcome may not be achieved is that individual workers may
engage in strategic behavior designed to position themselves as free
riders.
The calculations of individual workers also provide another reason
why Equipment B may not be installed. With Equipment A, an indi-
vidual worker can be certain that the equipment will be installed if
she eschews strategic behavior and accepts a reduction in wages equal
to the value she places on the clean air produced by the equipment.
Because the equipment costs one and the worker values the clean air
at two, the employer would be willing to promise to install the equip-
ment in return for the agreement to accept lower wages. With Equip-
ment B, however, an individual worker cannot operate with such





This result is required because, by definition, if a collective term is provided to
one worker, other workers cannot be excluded from its benefits.
The odds of Equipment A being installed, of course, are greater than the odds of
Equipment B being installed. With Equipment A, only one worker need not en-
gage in this type of strategic behavior for the equipment to be installed. For
Equipment B, at least four workers must refrain from the strategic behavior.
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
Table A. Costs and Benefits of a Collective Term.
Marginal Cost Value to Value to Marginal
of Additional Individual Workers Value to
Equipment Cost Equipment Worker as Group Group
None 0 - 0 0 -
A 1 1 2 20 20
B 20 19 5 50 30
worker would only be willing to agree to a maximum wage reduction
of five, the equipment will only be installed if other workers also es-
chew strategic behavior. As a result, in deciding on the amount of
lower wages to accept in return for the cleaner air produced by Equip-
ment B, the individual worker should discount the value of the
cleaner air to her (five) by the probability that the equipment will ac-
tually be installed. Depending on the size of the discount73 and the
ratio of the marginal cost of the additional equipment to its overall
marginal value,74 Equipment B may not be purchased even though it
would be efficient to do so. Thus, even in the absence of strategic be-
havior, one can only be certain that efficient collective terms will be
produced if, as with equipment A, the value of the terms to an individ-
ual worker exceeds the cost of producing the terms for all the
workers.75
The discussion to this point has emphasized factors on the supply-
worker side which might lead to the underproduction of collective
terms. In a perfectly competitive environment, there would also be
factors on the demand-employer side which should lead to the optimal
production of collective terms. If one employer offers a collective
term and lower wages to its workers and the savings in lower wages
exceed the cost of providing the collective term, that employer would
have a competitive advantage over employers who do not offer the col-
lective term. All other things being equal, the employer offering the
collective term should prosper at the expense of the other employ-
73. The size of the discount will depend on factors such as the individual worker's
risk averseness, the worker's evaluation of the risk averseness and probability of
strategic behavior of her co-workers, and the willingness of the employer to com-
mit to installing the equipment.
74. It would become increasingly more likely that the equipment would not be
purchased as the ratio approaches one. (If the ratio were one or above, of course,
it would not be efficient to purchase the equipment in any event.)
75. The text discusses only the issue of whether a collective term will be produced.
Another issue that arises with collective terms is whether the amount of the col-
lective term produced is optimal. Without collective action, the optimal amount
of a collective term will be provided only if "[t]he marginal cost of additional
units of the collective [term are] shared in exactly the same proportion as the
additional benefits.... If marginal costs are shared in any other way, the amount
of [the collective term] provided will be sub-optimal." M. OLSON, supra note 66,
at 30-31 (emphasis in original).
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ers.7 6 Thus, in a perfectly competitive environment, factors on the de-
mand-employer side would tend to produce collective terms even if
there were impediments on the supply-worker side.
For a number of reasons, however, there are impediments to the
production of collective terms from demand-side pressures, too. A col-
lective term will permit an offering employer to prosper at the ex-
pense of other employers only if a number of conditions are met.
First, the offering employer will prosper only if the collective term is
indeed efficient, that is, only if the cost of offering the term is less
than the value of the term to workers.77 To determine whether the
term is efficient, then, the offering employer must accurately assess
the value of the term to its workers. But because of the strategic be-
havior described above, it will not be easy--and may not be possible-
for the employer to make that assessment.
Second, employers will prosper only if their managers attempt to
determine whether collective terms are efficient and only if the man-
agers then act on correct calculations that the terms are efficient.
Managers, however, may not fulfill their role. Because managers
would not receive the full savings made by offering a collective term
(instead they would have to share them with shareholders, bondhold-
ers, other managers, etc.), they may decide that, at the margin, the
costs to the manager of offering the collective term outweigh the bene-
fits to the manager from any gains.78
Third, employers will prosper from offering collective terms only if
the gains affect decisions at the margin. In many instances, however,
the gains from offering collective terms may not affect decisions at the
margin because they are too minimal or too difficult to detect and as-
sess. For example, one of the ways in which an employer might pros-
per by offering a wage package that includes efficient collective terms
76. Employers offering collective terms will, in essence, be hiring workers at a lower
rate of pay, thus their money profits will increase, which should encourage them
to expand. Because of their competitive advantage, employers offering collective
terms should eventually be able to drive other employers out of business.
77. If the cost of the term is greater than its value to workers, the employer would be
at a competitive disadvantage; the employer would, in effect, be paying more for
labor than its competitors.
78. There is a significant literature on this phenomenon of managerial slack. See
Leibenstein, Microeconomics and X-Efficiency Theory: If There Is No Crisis,
There Ought To Be, PUB. INTEREST 97, 102-03 (Special Issue 1980); Jensen &
Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Owner-
ship Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308-10 (1976); Alchian & Demsetz, Production,
Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 778-81
(1972); Leibenstein, Allocative Efficiency vs. "X-Efficiency," 56 Am. ECON. REV.
392 (1966); A. HmscHmAN, ExiT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY 9-15 (1970). For legal ap-
plications of the notion, see Leslie, supra note 19, at 371-74; Easterbrook & Fis-
chel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer,
94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1169-70 (1981).
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is by attracting or retaining workers. Workers, however, are often un-
aware of collective terms. 79 Even when workers are aware of the
terms, the value of the terms is often difficult to assess. The effort
required to compare the relative value of cleaner air vis-a-vis a wage
increase of two, probably often means that the comparison is simply
not made, and the relevant decision is made on other grounds. Fi-
nally, even when workers are aware of collective terms and can assess
their value, that value may be too insignificant to affect many deci-
sions. For example, if the net gain for a worker from a collective term
is two in a total wage package of 1,000, the influence of the gain on the
worker's decision is likely to be overridden by other factors, many of
which are outside of the employer's control (for instance, factors such
as commuting time or location of spouse's employment).
Collective terms, then, present a situation in which the market by
itself may not achieve the efficient outcome. Minimal terms are one
way of breaking this roadblock. When minimal terms provide collec-
tive terms that are efficient and that otherwise would not be provided,
the minimal terms are not subject to the standard objection. The
terms will not result in unemployment because employers will make a
compensating change in the workers' wages to cover the cost of pro-
viding the terms and, as a result, the overall wage and employment
levels will not move from equilibrium. Moreover, the workers prefer
the new wage package (with the minimal term and a lower wage) be-
cause they place a higher value on the minimal term than they do on
the lost wages.
Minimal terms, however, are not a very fine-tuned method of
breaking the roadblock. Minimal terms generally apply to broad
classes of employers. As a result, even when they require collective
terms, minimal terms may not be efficient with respect to every em-
ployer to which they apply. If a minimal term required all employers
to provide Equipment B,80 for example, the minimal term would be
inefficient for employers with six or fewer workers, but efficient for
employers with seven or more workers.8 1 Despite this, minimal terms
79. Employment contracts often contain hundreds of provisions, so it is intuitively
sensible that workers are often unaware of particular collective terms. Although
I know of no empirical research on the awareness of workers of collective terms, I
have ample anecdotal evidence of unawareness. A co-worker of mine, for exam-
ple, recently commented that he discovered the University provides a spousal life
insurance policy only after his spouse had passed away.
80. See supra notes 69-75 and accompanying text.
81. This is true because the marginal cost of Equipment B is fixed, while the margi-
nal value of the equipment to the workers as a group increases with each addi-
tional worker. For six workers, then, the marginal cost of the equipment is 19,
but the marginal value to the workers (the value of the equipment to the workers
over Equipment A-three per worker) is only 18; the equipment costs more than
its value and so the requirement that it be provided is inefficient. With seven
workers, the cost of the equipment is still 19, but the value to the workers is 21;
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would be justified if the efficiencies created by them outweigh the in-
efficiencies. In the example, a minimal term requiring Equipment B
would be justified if the efficiency gains of workers employed by large
employers outweighed the efficiency losses of workers employed by
small employers.
Viewed in this way, minimal terms which require collective terms
are more likely to be necessary in a labor market in which there is a
low level of unionization. Collective bargaining is another, but a finer-
tuned, mechanism for breaking the roadblock that results in an under-
production of collective terms. Collective bargaining enables the
union, an entity with better access to worker preferences than the em-
ployer, to assess those preferences and then to demand the minimal
term if it is efficient or to demand instead higher wages if the minimal
term is not efficient.8 2 Thus, minimal terms may be less necessary
when a large portion of the worldorce is unionized because the extent
of the inefficiencies caused by the roadblock should be less in that type
of labor market.
In summary, minimal terms requiring employers to provide collec-
tive terms may not be subject to the standard objection. In the absence
of minimal terms or collective bargaining, collective terms are likely
to be underproduced. Thus, this type of minimal term is justified on
efficiency grounds if its effect is merely to produce the quantity of col-
lective terms which would be produced in a perfectly competitive la-
bor market. The efficiency of a minimal term of this type, then,
cannot be determined simply by reciting the standard economic objec-
tion. Instead, the efficiency or inefficiency of a minimal term which
might fall into this category depends upon very difficult empirical as-
sessments, first, to determine whether the good provided by the term
is actually a collective good and, second, to determine whether the
quantity of the good provided is optimal.
2. Imperfect Information
Imperfect information is a common justification for governmental
intervention in markets of various kinds,83 including labor markets.8 4
the equipment costs less than its value and so the requirement that it be provided
is efficient.
82. See R. FREEMAN & J. MEDOFF, WHAT Do UNIONS Do? 7-11 (1984); Leslie, supra
note 19, at 374-80. See generally A. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 78, at 30-43.
83. See S. BRuruR, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 26-28 (1982); Arnould & Grabowski,
Auto Safety Regulation: An Analysis of Market Failure, 12 BELL J. ECON. 27,28-
30 (1981); Schwartz & Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect
Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630 (1979).
84. See Sunstein, supra note 46, at 1055-56; Note, Protecting At Will Employees
Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93
HARv. L. REv. 1816, 1830-33 (1980).
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Various forms of the argument provide weak and strong justifications
for minimal terms.
The conventional argument from imperfect information is that
workers cannot enter into optimal employment contracts if they do
not have all of the information necessary to evaluate their options.8 5
Consider again the worker who is attempting to decide whether to ac-
cept a wage reduction in return for a "for cause" provision which
would provide some protection against discharge.86 If the worker be-
lieves that she has some protections against discharge even without a
"for cause" provision when in fact she does not,8 7 she is likely to un-
derestimate the value of the provision and, as a result, may fail to buy
it even though she should. Other workers may understand the limita-
tions of their protections in the absence of a "for cause" provision and
yet fail to purchase the provision because they underestimate the risk
of discharge and, hence, underestimate the provision's potential bene-
fits.88 Once again, this information failure could lead to an inefficient
result-the worker may not buy the "for cause" provision even though
it is worth more to her than the wages.8 9
Imperfect information does not justify intervention, however,
merely because individual workers make mistakes. Intervention is jus-
tified only if the labor market fails to produce optimal terms because
workers make decisions based on imperfect information.9 0 Even if
many workers make mistakes because of imperfect information, opti-
mal terms may be produced. If some workers seek optimal terms9 '
and if employers both wish to attract those workers and cannot distin-
85. Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 83, at 632-35.
86. See discussion of waivable rights supra pp. 115-19.
87. I know of no empirical studies of the perceptions of workers of their protections
from discharge in the absence of "for cause" provisions, but I know of considera-
ble anecdotal evidence that workers overestimate these protections. The stu-
dents in my labor-related classes uniformly overestimate the common law
protections workers receive and practicing lawyers tell me that workers regu-
larly, but often incorrectly, expect the law to provide a remedy for discharges.
88. Some evidence suggests that workers tend to underestimate the possibility that
they may lose their jobs. See SURVEY RESEARCH CENTER, UNIV. OF MICHIGAN,
SURVEY OF WORKING CONDITIONS 360-63 (1970); L. ADAMS & R. ARONSON, WORK-
ERS AND INDUSTRIAL CHANGE (1957). Cf., J. GETMAN, S. GOLDBERG & J. HERMAN,
UNION REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS: LAW AND REALITY 87-88 (1976) (workers
during a union election campaign tend to discount their risk of job loss during the
campaign). This evidence is consistent with evidence that people in general tend
to underestimate the risk that bad things will happen to them. See Arnould &
Grabowski, supra note 83, at 34-35 (drivers underestimated their risk of an acci-
dent); Kunreuther, Limited Knowledge and Insurance Protection, 24 PUB. POL'Y
227, 234-36 (1976) (people underestimate probability of severe floods and
earthquakes).
89. A similar inefficiency may occur when there is asymmetrical information. For an
example, see Schwab, supra note 48, at 279-80 & n. 130.
90. Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 83, at 638.
91. Workers may make different investments in obtaining information. As a result,
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guish between them and the workers making mistakes, 92 the market
should produce optimal terms. In essence, those workers who demand
optimal terms protect other workers from the consequences of their
limited information. On the other hand, if insufficient numbers of
workers seek optimal terms, or if employers do not wish to attract
those workers, or if employers can distinguish between those workers
and workers with imperfect information, the labor market may fail to
produce optimal terms.9 3
Intervention in the labor market is justified, then, if the labor mar-
ket fails to produce optimal terms because workers make decisions on
the basis of imperfect information. This provides only a weak justifi-
cation for minimal terms, however, because there are other, less intru-
sive options for remedying this type of information failure. Ensuring
that workers receive fuller information on the "for cause" provision,
either by requiring the employer to provide it94 or by having the gov-
ernment provide it, would remedy the information failure and lead to
a more fine-tuned result than simply requiring the "for cause" provi-
sion. It would permit those workers who prefer higher wages even
when they have knowledge of the true value of the "for cause" provi-
sion, to continue to receive higher wages.95
Another type of information failure provides a stronger justifica-
tion for minimal terms. If there is information failure not because of
limited information, but because workers cannot rationally evaluate
the available information,96 the less intrusive remedial option of pro-
some may be able to accurately assess the value of a term like the "for cause"
provision, while others may not.
92. Employers, for example, would not be able to distinguish between workers with
good information and workers with imperfect information if the term is collective
in nature. If the employer offers a collective term to one worker, other workers
will be able to share in its benefits. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
93. Although a full analysis is outside the scope of this article, the labor market dis-
plays many of the symptoms of a noncompetitive market, particularly with re-
spect to non-wage benefits. Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 83, at 655-56. Wages
and other terms of employment are not clustered. See Weiler, The Wages of Sex.
The Uses and Limits of Comparable Worth, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1728, 1760-61
(1986); WomEN, WORK AND WAGEs, supra note 17, at 49-50. Advertising of terms
is common only with respect to wages. Comparison shopping is expensive in
terms of both time and expense, in large part because employment terms are not
generally stated in a standard or easily understandable form. A. REES, supra note
23, at 88-90.
94. Requiring the employer to provide the information, of course, would be a mini-
mal term in itself. In the absence of a requirement that the employer provide the
information, a worker presumably would have to accept a reduction i pay to
receive it.
95. Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 83, at 666-71.
96. Even though this challenges the basic assumptions of economics, leading econo-
mists have long recognized it as a possibility. Becker, Irrational Behavior and
Economic Theory, 70 J. POL. ECON. 1 (1962); Hirschman, Obstacles to Develop-
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viding information may not be effective. Minimal terms may be re-
quired to correct the suboptimal choices made by workers.
Information overload and cognitive dissonance are two reasons
workers may not be able to effectively evaluate the information neces-
sary to make a choice. Evidence from outside the employment context
suggests that there is a point at which additional information becomes
dysfunctional; that is, the additional information does not contribute
to a better decision because the people to whom it is provided are
"overloaded" and simply cannot process it.97 To the extent informa-
tion overload occurs, one would expect it to occur in the employment
context. Employment contracts cover a broad range of topics, many of
them quite complex; they are often expected to remain in effect for
long periods of time; and workers are often poorly equipped to evalu-
ate them. Thus, minimal terms may be justified when there is evi-
dence of information failure and when it is likely that the failure
cannot be remedied simply by providing additional information. 98
Cognitive dissonance may also interfere with the ability of workers
to evaluate additional information. Stated generally, cognitive disso-
nance means that people are uncomfortable when they simultane-
ously hold two conflicting ideas. People prefer to view themselves as
smart and if new information indicates that a prior belief was in error,
the new information tends to undermine the preferred self-image. As
a consequence, people tend to reject, ignore or accommodate informa-
tion that conflicts with prior beliefs.
Cognitive dissonance may also justify minimal terms. To illustrate,
consider workers who when they first choose a job, choose an industry
that is hazardous, but necessarily hazardous because no safety equip-
ment is available to correct the hazards. Over time, cognitive disso-
nance may lead the workers to believe that the job is really fairly safe.
(Smart workers would not work at a hazardous job, therefore the
workers must either view themselves as not smart or their jobs as not
hazardous. Viewing the jobs as safe is less threatening to the workers'
self-image.) If cost-effective safety equipment then becomes available,
the workers will not purchase the equipment (by accepting a reduc-
tion in their wages). Because of cognitive dissonance, they have come
to believe that their jobs are safe even without the equipment. As a
ment A Class fwation and a Quasi-Vanishing Act, 13 ECON. DEv. & CuLTuRAL
CHANGE 385 (1965); A. HIRscHmAN supra note 78, at 93-96, 146-55.
97. See Davis, Protecting Consumers From Overdisclosure and Gobbledygook- An
Empirical Look at the Simplification of Consumer-Credit Contracts, 63 VA. L.
REV. 841, 847-50 (1977) and authorities cited therein. But see Schwartz & Wilde,
supra note 83, at 675-76 & n.100.
98. Minimal terms, then, are more likely to be justified for this reason when the
terms cover complex areas of the employment contract and are expected to ex-
tend for long periods of time, and when the workers tend to be poorly educated
and, hence, unequipped to evaluate the terms.
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result, they are unable to evaluate fairly the value of the newly avail-
able equipment. A minimal term which required the equipment to be
installed would be necessary to achieve the efficient outcome. 99
Minimal terms may also correct for information failure from the
other side of the ledger-they may increase efficiency by improving
the information base of employers. Employers can learn about
worker perceptions of the compensation package they offer workers
(and, indeed, about worker ideas on ways in which work can be reor-
ganized to enhance productivity) in one of two ways. They can learn
when workers quit to take other jobs (exit) or they can learn when
workers tell them what they think about the compensation package
(voice).1 00 Clearly, learning through voice has several advantages for
both employers and workers: the costs of job search and transfer are
nimiz ed; the investment in job-specific training is not lost; the
message is clearer since the communication is direct and the employer
need not infer worker perceptions from numerous exits; and so on.
Nevertheless, voice is likely to be underutilized:
[W]orkers... are unlikely to reveal their true preferences to an employer, for
fear the employer may fire them. In a world in which workers could find
employment at the same wages immediately, the market would offer adequate
protection for the individual, but that is not the world we live in. The danger
of job loss makes expression of voice by an individual risky.101
Because of this, a minimal term which encourages voice may be
efficient. A minimal term requiring cause for discharge, for example,
would be likely to cause workers to increase the use of voice to com-
municate with the employer (because they would be less fearful of
discharge when they expressed displeasure), and to decrease corre-
spondingly the use of exit. Thus, the minimal term should result in
gains both because the employer has obtained better and quicker feed-
back from workers which should enable it to make productivity-en-
hancing changes in the workplace, and because the costs of exit (job
search costs, loss of training investment, etc.) can be minimized. If
these gains outweigh the costs of administering the "for cause" sys-
tem, the minimal term would-be efficient.102
99. This discussion draws heavily upon Akerlof & Dickens, The Economic Conse-
quences of Cognitive Dissonance, 72 Ab. ECON. REv. 307 (1982). See also Sun-
stein, supra note 48, at 1166-69.
100. The seminal work in this area is A. HmscHMAN, supra note 78. Several others
have expanded on Hirshman's ideas, most notably Freeman and Medoff. See R.
FREEMAN & J. MEDOFF, supra note 82; Freeman & Medoff, The Two Faces of
Unionism, 57 PUB. INTERESr 69 (1979); Williamson, The Economics of Internal
Organization" Exit and Voice in Relation to Markets and Hierarchies, 66 AM.
ECON. REv. 369 (1976); Freeman, Individual Mobility and Union Voice in the
Labor Market, 66 AM. ECON. REV. 361 (1976).
101. R. FREEMAN & J. MEDOFF, supra note 82, at 9.
102. Although I know of no studies dealing explicitly with the effects of "for cause"
provisions, there are studies which indicate that increased worker participation
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Minimal terms may lead to a more efficient outcome, then, in sev-
eral circumstances related to information imperfections. Minimal
terms may be efficient when workers do not have the information nec-
essary to evaluate the value of an employment term, when workers
are intellectually or psychologically unable to value accurately an em-
ployment term, or when employers operate with poor information be-
cause workers are reluctant to exercise voice.
3. External Costs
Minimal terms may also be justified when employment terms im-
pose costs on third parties, that is, when there are "external" costs
that are not weighed by employers and workers when they negotiate
the employment contract.10 3
Consider an employer that hires a worker who smokes. In a price
theory world, the employer would pay the worker less than a worker
who does not smoke by an amount equal to the extra costs imposed on
the employer by smoking. Thus, if smokers are absent from work
more often than non-smokers, the employer should pay a lower wage
to a worker who smokes to compensate for the costs to the employer
of the extra absences. Considering only the employer and the smok-
ing worker, the price theory world would optimally balance the desire
of workers to smoke and the employment costs associated with smok-
ing. A worker would smoke if she valued smoking more than the de-
crease in pay caused by her smoking. An employer would hire
smokers if they would agree to work for an amount sufficiently less
than non-smokers to compensate the employer for its increased costs.
Some of the costs of smoking in the workplace, however, may be
external, that is, they may be imposed on parties other than the em-
ployer and the smoking worker. Fellow workers, health and life in-
surance companies, social welfare agencies, and others may all bear
some of the costs of smoking.l0 4 To the extent this occurs, the effi-
and job security enhance productivity. SPECIAL TAsK FORCE, DEP'T OF HEALTH,
EDUC. AND WELFARE, WORK IN AMERICA 93-110, 188-201 (1973) (reporting on re-
sults of several studies).
103. The argument from external costs is, in a sense, the flip side of the argument
from collective terms. With external costs, some of the costs of employment
terms are imposed on third parties, so "too many" of the terms are produced.
With collective terms, third parties absorb some of the benefits of the employ-
ment terms, so "too few" of them are produced. Both external costs and collec-
tive terms, then, result in inefficiencies. At times, the distinction between
external costs and collective terms becomes quite fine, if not illusory. Pollution,
for example, may be an external cost, while clean air may be a collective good. P,
NELSON & S. WINTER, AN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF ECONOMIC CHANGE 367-68
(1982).
104. Fellow workers may bear some of the costs to the extent passive smoke causes
illness and, hence, increased absences or to the extent passive smoke merely cre-
ates a need for more breaks which lowers productivity. Health and life insurance
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cient result may not be achieved. The costs of smoking are actually
higher than the amount by which the employer reduces the pay of
smokers; the employer reduces the pay only enough to recapture its
losses, not enough to recapture all losses associated with smoking. As
a result, some workers will continue to smoke even though they would
not if they had to accept a reduction in pay sufficient to cover all of the
costs of smoking. There will be "too much" smoking in the
workplace. 105
Minimal terms can be used to correct for this type of overproduc-
tion. The test of efficiency is what the market would have produced if
all the costs of workplace smoking were considered.106 A minimal
term which prohibited workplace smoking, or which taxed employers
or workers for workplace smoking, would reduce the amount of work-
place smoking and may produce an amount of smoking which closer
approximates the efficient ideal.
Minimal terms, of course, may overcorrect. A minimal term which
prohibited smoking would be likely to produce "too little" workplace
smoking because it would prohibit smoking by workers who would
smoke even if they had to absorb all the costs. Even in this situation,
however, the minimal term may be justified. If the "too low" amount
of smoking with the minimal term was closer to the efficient ideal
than the "too high" amount of smoking without the minimal term, the
minimal term would be justifiable on efficiency grounds.107
4. Summary of Efficiency Justifications
In a number of situations, then, minimal terms may result in an
increase in efficiency: when the minimal terms provide collective
goods that otherwise would be underproduced; when there are impedi-
ments to the free flow of information because of overload, cognitive
dissonance, or a suboptimal exercise of voice; or when there are costs
which employers and workers do not fully consider when they are ne-
gotiating employment terms because they are likely to be borne by
companies may bear some of the costs to the extent they provide coverage for
smokers at the same rates as they do for non-smokers. (More precisely, when
insurance companies fail to distinguish between smokers and non-smokers, the
insured non-smokers subsidize smokers.) Social welfare agencies which absorb
some of the costs associated with sick or unemployed workers would also bear
some of the costs of smoking workers.
105. Health and safety laws may be supported by a similar argument. See R. POsNER,
supra note 14, at 312. See generally C. GoE=Z, supra note 50, at 441-44.
106. Stated another way, the test of efficiency is what the market would have pro-
duced if transaction costs were low. If transaction costs were low, the smoking
employees could reimburse all those who have costs imposed upon them by the
smoking. See R. PosNER, THE EcoNOmics OF JusTiCE 61-65 (1981); R. POSNER,
supra note 14, at 12-15.
107. For another example, see Epstein, The Historical Origins and Economic Struc-




Acceptance or rejection of minimal terms on efficiency grounds,
then, does not flow naturally from economic theory alone. Instead,
the policy recommendation from an economic analysis of any particu-
lar minimal term depends on a complex empirical assessment of the
term.
B. Distributional Justifications
Minimal terms are popular politically because the common percep-
tion is that they benefit workers at the expense of employers. When
the government requires employers to provide maternity benefits or
health insurance, the perception is that employers will pay for the
benefits, that there will be a reduction in employer profits and a corre-
sponding increase in worker compensation.
The standard objection casts doubt on this type of distributional
justification for minimal terms. According to the standard objection,
employers shift the costs of minimal terms to workers through unem-
ployment, lower wages, or both. Thus, workers pay for their own min-
imal terms. The minimal terms make workers worse off because they
presumptively prefer fuller employment and higher wages to the min-
imal terms.109
Whether the common perception or the standard objection better
describes the distributional effects of minimal terms depends on the
rigidity of the relevant labor market. To the extent employers in the
relevant market have the unfettered ability to respond to minimal
terms by lowering wages and/or reducing employment levels, the
costs of minimal terms can be transferred to workers. The standard
objection, then, better describes that type of flexible labor market.
Other labor markets, however, may be more rigid. Certain em-
108. Minimal terms may also increase efficiency (and sometimes result in distribu-
tional changes) in labor markets which exhibit certain characteristics. Minimal
terms may increase efficiency, for example, when there is a backward-bending
supply curve, see B. FLEISHER & T. KNEISNER, supra note 19, at 177-79, or when
the labor market is monopsonistic, H. WACHTEL, supra note 19, at 94-99; B.
FLEISHER & T. KNEISNER, supra note 19, at 203-11, or oligopolistic. H. WACHTEL,
supra note 19, at 90-94; A. CARTrER & F. MARSHALL, supra note 19, at 253-56.
Minimal terms which applied in jurisdictions in which these types of markets
outnumbered more competitive labor markets, or which were narrowly tailored
to apply only to these types of markets within a jurisdiction, would result in an
increase in efficiency (and/or in desirable distributional changes). I have not con-
sidered these types of efficiency justifications for minimal terms because,
although the question is ultimately an empirical one, it does not appear that these
types of labor markets predominate in any significant jurisdiction, see R. BUNT-
ING, EMPLoYER CONCENTRATION IN LOCAL LABOR MARKETS (1962), and because I
know of no attempts to narrowly tailor minimal terms so as to apply only to cer-
tain labor markets within a jurisdiction.
109. See sup'ra p. 114.
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ployers, for example, may not be able to respond to minimal terms by
lowering wages because of minimum wage laws or because of individ-
ual or collective contracts requiring a certain level of wages. Indeed,
only in very rare circumstances will employers be able to transfer all
the costs of minimal terms to workers through lower wages.110 If un-
110. In the usual case where the supply curve is positively sloped, the employer will
have to absorb a portion of the cost of minimal terms which varies depending on
the relative elasticities of the supply and demand curves. This is illustrated in
Figures 8 and 9 which demonstrate the wage effects of inefficient minimal terms
(i.e., ones which cost employers more than they are valued by workers) by shift-
ing the demand curve but not the supply curve after imposition of the term. See
supra note 70. In Figure 8, the supply curve is inelastic relative to the demand
curves. (That is, changes along the wages axis create smaller changes along the
quantity of labor axis for the supply curve than for the demand curves.) As a
result, a relatively large portion, but not all, of the total cost of the minimal term
(CW2) is absorbed by a reduction in wages (W1W2). The employer absorbs the
remainder of the cost (CW1). In Figure 9, the supply curve is elastic relative to
the demand curves. In comparison with Figure 8, then, a relatively small portion,
but still some, of the total cost of the minimal term is absorbed by a reduction in
wages. The employer will be able to transfer all (or more than) the costs of mini-
mal terms to workers through lower wages only where the supply curve exhibits
zero elasticity (or where the supply curve is negatively sloped). See Harrison,







employment effects are not considered,111 employers will have to ab-
sorb some of the cost of minimal terms in the vast majority of cases.112
Similarly, certain employers may not be able to reduce employment
levels because of plant closing notification laws or because they have
made long-term investments in specialized types of equipment. In
these more rigid labor markets, then, employers may have to absorb








111. In a sense, those people who are unemployed as a result of minimal terms have
decided that their nonmarket opportunities are greater than their market oppor-
tunities at the lower wage level. Thus, the young may constitute a disproportion-
ate number of those who become unemployed because their opportunities for
schooling and other nonmarket training which may increase their future earn-
ings are greater. Viewed in this way, the unemployment effects of minimal
terms, although still important, are less troublesome. Instead of dropping into a
well of doom and despair, those who become unemployed fall upon the buffer
offered by nonnarket activities. Welch, supra note 41, at 36. See generally
Becker, A Theory of the Allocation of Time, 75 ECON. J. 493 (1965).
112. Depending on the market for their product, employers may be able to shift some
of these costs to consumers. Harrison, supra note 14, at 342-45. The precise rela-
tionship between effective wage increases and product price increases, however,
is quite complex. Goldstein & Smith, The Predicted Impact of the Black Lung
Benefits Program on the Coal Industry in 0. ASHENFELTER & J. BLUM, supra
note 41, at 135-49.
113. See Sunstein, supra note 46, at 1053-54; Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist
Motives in Contract and Tort Law, With Special Reference to Compulsory Terms
and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REv. 563, 609-14 (1982).
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the common perception may be accurate-minimal terms may cause a
redistribution from employers to workers.
Despite their differences, both the common perception and the
standard objection focus on the distribution between employers and
workers. Minimal terms, however, may also have distributional ef-
fects between various classes of workers and, as a result, may be more
or less desirable depending on the direction of the redistribution and
the definition of the classes of workers. A minimal term requiring
paid maternity leave,_ for example, may redistribute resources from
male workers to female workers. To the extent the employer shifts
the cost of the minimal term to workers, it should be borne by male
and female workers in rough proportion 14 to their numbers in the
workforce.115 The benefits of the term, however, would flow entirely
to female workers. If one believes that female workers are disadvan-
taged in the workplace,116 this type of distributional result would pro-
vide a justification for the minimal term. 17 Other examples of
minimal terms that might be justified with this type of distributional
argument include (1) prohibitions on discharges for failure to submit
to sexual harrassment (which should result in a redistribution from
114. The actual distributional effects of a minimal term may be quite difficult to iden-
tify. The minimal term requiring maternity leave, for example, would increase
the cost of labor and, as a result, would encourage employers to replace labor
with labor-saving equipment (e.g., it would encourage employers to invest in
word processing equipment and reduce the number of secretaries employed). To
the extent the employer can lawfully distinguish between male and female labor
(e.g., where the labor force is sex-segregated by occupation), the costs of the mini-
mal term may be borne disproportionately by female workers.
115. Assuming that the employer can pass on all of the costs of the minimal term to
workers and that the costs are passed on pro rata (both fairly large assumptions),
the actual distributional effect would depend on the proportion of men and wo-
men employed. The larger the proportion of men employed, the larger the distri-
bution from male to female workers.
116. See generally WOMEN, WORK, AND WAGEs, supra note 17; Blumrosen, Wage Dis-
crimination, Job Segregation, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,12 U.
MICH. J. L. REF. 399 (1979).
117. To be complete, the justification would also have to address the claims that the
government should not engage in redistribution efforts at all (or, if they must,
they should do so only very rarely), see R. Nozicx, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA
149-53, 167-74 (1974); F. HAYEK, THE CoNsTrrU'iON OF LIBERTY 93-102, 133-61
(1961); M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 14, at 161-76, and that, if a redistribution effort
does take place, it should be done through the tax system rather than through a
regulatory system. A. POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 105-
13 (1983); Olsen, An Econometric Analysis of Rent Control, 80 J. POL. EcON. 1081,
1096-99 (1972). For general discussions of those issues, see Shavell, A Note on
Efficiency vs. Distributional Equity in Legal Rulemaking: Should Distributional
Equity Matter Given Optimal Income Taxation, 71 AM. ECON. RE,. PRoc. 414,
414-18 (1981); Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89 YALE L.J. 472,
498, 510 (1980); Markovits, The Distributive Impact Allocative EfWiciency, and
Overall Desirability of Ideal Housing Codes: Some Theoretical Clarifications, 89
HARV. L. REv. 1815, 1827-38 (1976).
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supervisors who otherwise would harrass to workers who otherwise
would be harrassed);1s (2) severance pay requirements (which should
result in a redistribution from workers with stable employment to
workers with unstable employment); and (3) perhaps limitations on
the discharge-at-will rule.119
Distributional effects between various classes of workers may also
provide arguments against certain minimal terms. The familiar objec-
tion to minimum wage laws, which is one instance of the standard eco-
nomic objection, provides an example. The objection to minimum
wage laws is that the benefits which flow to workers in the covered
sector who remain employed are paid for by other workers who lose
their jobs in the covered sector and are either unemployed or forced to
work in the uncovered sector where the wages are depressed because
of the increased competition between workers for jobs. The workers
who pay for the minimum wage laws, the argument goes, are those
with the lowest productive capacity, that is, the young, minorities,
those with low levels of education and wealth, and so on.1 20
The distributional consequences of minimal terms, then, are rele-
vant to an economic consideration of them. "Good" distributional ef-
fects provide a rationale for minimal terms; "bad" distributional
effects undermine them. In either event, evaluation of the distribu-
tional consequences depends on a sophisticated empirical assessment
of the extent of the redistribution, its direction, and the classes of em-
ployers and workers affected.
IV. CONCLUSION
This article was "inspired" by a comment made at the 1987 Annual
Meeting of the Association of American Law Schools. An anonymous
commentator from the audience spoke in response to Professor Lord
Wedderburn of the London School of Economics. Professor Lord Wed-
derburn had argued that the labor force statistics in England did not
indicate that England's unfair dismissal law had had any adverse ef-
fects on the economy. The commentator said that attempting to em-
pirically measure the effects of the unfair dismissal law on the
economy was like trying to determine how much birds weighed by
weighing the elephants on which the birds were perched. The weight
118. Kennedy, supra note 113, at 610.
119. Sunstein, supra note 46, at 1054.
120. See, e.g., F. WELCH, supra note 40; Kosters & Welch, The Effects of Minimum
Wages on the Distribution of Changes in Aggregate Employment, 62 AM. ECON.
REV. 323 (1972); J. PETERSON & C. STEWART, JR., EMPLOYMENT EFFECTS OF MINI-
MUM WAGE RATES (1969). For a survey of the literature, see Brown, Gilroy &
Kohen, The Effect of the Minimum Wage on Employment and Unemployment,
20 J. ECON. LIT. 487 (1982). But see supra note 111; Leffler, Minimum Wages,
Welfare, and Wealth Transfers to the Poor, 21 J. LAW & ECON. 345 (1978).
[Vol. 67:101
STANDARD ECONOMIC OBJECTION
of the elephants dwarfed into insignificance the weight of the birds.
Despite the futility of empirical assessments, the anonymous commen-
tator continued, economics offers a powerful theoretical objection to
unfair dismissal laws. The commentator asked Professor Lord Wed-
derburn to respond to the theoretical objection. Professor Lord Wed-
derburn declined. This article, in a sense, is a response.
The theoretical objection to minimal terms provided by economics
cannot be divorced from the very difficult empirical issues raised by
economic analysis. The objection is forceful only if certain conditions
are met, conditions that can be confirmed or rejected only through
empirical studies. Indeed, if the empirical studies'indicate that other
conditions are present (for example, if the studies indicate that the
benefits provided by a minimal term are practically collective or that
the minimal terms address certain types of information imperfec-
tions), economics can provide powerful support for minimal terms.
The value of a theoretical economic analysis of minimal terms is not
that it provides definitive answers, but rather that it isolates empirical
inquiries that, if answered,121 might permit us to better understand
the value and consequences of minimal terms.
121. Undoubtedly, as the commentator colorfully indicated, resolving the empirical
issues will not be easy. There should not, however, be a presumption against the
promulgation of individual employment rights while the empirical issues are be-
ing addressed because there is no a priori reason for believing that the set of
conditions supporting the objection are true. In our worse-than-second-best
world, decision makers will often have to act or not act on rough intuitive assess-
ments of the relevant conditions. See Kennedy, supra note 113, at 614.
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